Marine Units Deactivate in Aggressive Plan to Reshape the Corps

Marine Units Deactivate in Aggressive Plan to Reshape the Corps


U.S. Marine Corps Col. Denise Mull, commanding officer of Combat Logistics Regiment 25, and Sgt. Maj. Scott Schmitt, sergeant major of Combat Logistics Regiment 25, retire the regimental colors at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, July 1, 2020. (U.S. Marine Corps/Lance Cpl. Scott Jenkins)
6 Jul 2020
Military.com | By Gina Harkins
At least four Marine Corps units have cased their colors in recent weeks as part of an aggressive plan to reshape the force to take on future threats.

Two combat logistics regiments -- one on the East Coast and one on the West -- were the latest units to deactivate last week as the Marine Corps pushes forward with a years-long reorganization plan. Combat Logistics Regiment 25, based out of Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and CLR-15, out of Camp Pendleton, California, were both deactivated in July 1 ceremonies.

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The units' closures followed the June 22 deactivation of the Pendleton-based Bridge Company, 7th Engineer Support Battalion, and the May shuttering of CLR-35 in Japan.

The three combat logistics regiments were all stood up after the 2001 terror attacks in the U.S. The 7th ESB bridge company dated back to Vietnam.

"The commandant's plan is all about being a more mobile, lethal force. For us, that means small teams to get the job done," Col. Denise Mull, CLR-25's commanding officer, said at that unit's deactivation ceremony. "We're excited to see who can step up to fill the role that this regiment filled."

The supply and maintenance battalions that fell under the three combat logistics regiments will still exist, but now will be stand-alone units assigned to 1st, 2nd and 3rd Marine logistics groups.

Marine Commandant Gen. David Berger announced in March his sweeping plan to modernize the Corps for future fights. The plan calls for shedding about 16,000 Marines from the ranks by 2030.

The Marine Corps will no longer operate tanks or bridging companies as part of the plan, which also calls for fewer law enforcement personnel, infantry Marines and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter jets. The service recently released instructions for the more than 1,300 Marines whose jobs will be affected by the changes. They've been directed to consider moving into other fields within the Marine Corps or even joining other military branches.

Cost savings from those changes will be used to pay for equipment for long-range precision fires and other technology the Marine Corps will need to face off against more sophisticated adversaries, such as Russia or China.

"We're not saying that a tank or bridging company isn't of value," Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, the head of Marine Corps Combat Development Command, said during a recent interview. "... It's just that for the future fight, [those military occupational specialties] are of less value than the things that we need most."

The personnel and equipment affected by the deactivations are being distributed across the Marine logistics groups, according to service news releases. Col. Joon Um, CLR-35's commanding officer, said of his unit's deactivation that the move allowed for greater independence and agility so Marine leaders can respond more rapidly to changing conditions.

"This deactivation was absolutely necessary as the Marine Corps grows in a new direction to face different challenges," Um said.

 

So now im wondering how they are going to handle logistics and... does this make the marines more like mercs? or are they just going to let the Army do the tanks and bridging?

Alot of political speak in that announcement

 

The Marines are going back to what they do best.
Small groups, quick strikes and not an attempt to hold large battle ground, that's the Army's Job
In Nam some Diesel Submarines had enlarged guppy like hulls to hold Marines, feed and keep them on stand by for rapid ops this to enable better stand off time and standby to pick them up.

LURPS were often inserted this way.

SSBN Submarines have been converted for this job now.

 

Well, Armor forces are pretty much useless in most of the environments of today. Don't misunderstand me, they have their purpose but a 67 ton Abrams M1A1 size and weight works against in many cases. Also, infantry with the FGM-148 Javelin (~49 lbs., ~47 inches) which has defeated any armored vehicle it had ever engaged can devastate armor - quickly. The FGM-148 Javelin's major problem is its cost as each missile cost ~$100,000 (2019).

Anyway, interesting article...

 

thanks @HK_User for that brief explanation

 

Kindle Amazon
Boat Sailors: Vietnam War action by fleet submarines
In the mid-nineteen-sixties some conventional fleet submarines were refitted to carry small teams of combat swimmers (Underwater Demolition Teams [UDT] and Sea, Land and Air teams [SEALs]) for a variety of combat operations. Their primary mission was beach reconnaissance. Subic Bay provided the main base for operations and was known as Detachment Alpha (Det Alpha). Det Bravo was deployed on an APD, a high-speed transport ship. Det Charlie operated from the USS Perch APSS 313, and later the USS Grayback LPSS 574, and USS Tunny LPSS 282.
All three of these submarines were left over from World War II, but all were still plenty spirited.

 

Been aware of this for some time now, my oldest is a Marine Tanker, and he has been rumbling about the possibility of having to change over, but will likely retire before they turn in their tanks!

Looking back on where the Corps came from, this move makes a lot of sense, with Marines basically armed sailors embarked aboard Navy ships for quick work ashore, a return to their roots isn't a bad thing, but it does put more pressure on the Army and the other branches for longer term war fighting! The Marines have always been a sort of QRF reather then a take it and hold it kind of force, so not much will actually change in the bigger picture! Besides, between the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard for logistics ashore, the Corps should do well!

On the other end of things, the Coasties are getting a MAJOR boost in war fighting capabilities with the addition of 12 "Security Cutters" including up to 6 armed heavy ice breakers to replace the 1 heavy and two medium breakers they have, and to allow them to better counter the China and Russian moves into the Artic and Antarctic areas!

The Navy is the one with the biggest problems, no Frigs, Old DDG fleet and the Cruisers that are falling apart and in serious need of replacement! Combined with the failed Litoral ships and billions wasted, their in a serious world of hurt, basically over working there Burk class DDGs to death before replacements come! Really, the only branch in decent shape is the Air Force, and even then, their just hanging on, most of the flying airframes are over 30 years old, with some in the 40+ year old category!

 

Well, say what you want, but the one thing I learned as a Zoomie was

Nobody flies without supply.

Hate to be at the sharp end calling for a atry strike and be told "You're SOL - BINGO ammo...."

 

Those diesel boats were indeed converted. Equipment was carried in a deck mounted "pod" and manpower was inside the pressure hull. So far as I have been able to determine, NONE of the nukes were converted, their operating envelope will not deal with shallow water. There may have been some experiments done, but for sure NOT with the boomers, they are just too damn big for sneaky ops in close waters.

 

With the Bridge Company being deactivated and tanks going away I know two GS contractor that are out of a job.

Lots of this stuff was designed to fill needs identified in the 1940's. If Marines are on the wrong side of a river nowadays it's because some lieutenant picked the wrong spot on a map for his LZ.

I've been retired more than twenty years and have seen units come and go, reorganize, consolidate and split off into specialty groups. We started making big changes back toward speed and maneuverability back in the 90's when we got rid of self propelled artillery. I'd take a dozen M274 mechanical mules with 106mm recoilless rifles and M2 machine gun mounts over an up-armored HMMWV any day. Just about the same footprint on a ship, and loads more versatility. Roads are where IEDs are planted. Mules need no road and are not the big lumbering noisy target that the HMMWV has become. (I've never liked these AM General monstrosities)

Fewer 0311's is a great idea. You just have to live the "Every Marine a rifleman"
mantra. Maybe assign an 0369 Company Gunny, a few 0311/31 Platoon Sergeants and an assortment of 03XX Corporals to each support unit to get them up to speed.

It'd be much like my arrival at Cherry Point. I ask the S-3 Officer if I can get a Corpsman and a support vehicle to take my Marines on a force march. He comes back and asks if three miles in PT gear with canteens sounds good for a first hike.

I had a rather one sided talk with the young Captain and we did ten miles the first time, in Ute's and boots with flak jackets, full cartridge belt and rifles. We climbed the ropes that I'd had replaced on the obstacle course, and really shocked a bunch of young, and not-so-young Marines that there was more to the Marine Corps than hiding and sliding and "Swinging with the Wing." It was a great place to retire from, but I never felt at home with the Marine Aircraft Wing.

My Platoon Sergeant from that unit recently retired as a CWO5, so somebody was listening to my advice.

 

Maybe we could get a better deal with a group buy???

 

Perhaps the Corps is adapting for the 4th generation warfare dynamics.

 

Maybe the Spetsnaz has left more trash on the Alaska coast!

 

Old News >>Program Schedule. All four Trident conversions have been completed, andInitial Operational Capability (IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007.SSBN-726, the first ship to be converted, reportedly began its first operationaldeployment as an SSGN in October 2007.<<

Lot of conversions in the last two decades. Best to me is the auto load system for replenishment of stores.
In this a Missile tube is converted to a loading system in which a prepacked load of needed items can be loaded by a crane and unpacked as needed.
No more hand loading for deployment or a quickie in and out of a port (or other) for extended patrol.
Recycling at its best.
Read on Below.
Special Operations Forces Dive Deep
May 2006
By Rita Boland


The USS Ohio, converted from a nuclear ballistic missile to a guided missile submarine, sails during its return-to-service ceremony. The boat is the first refurbished vessel of four.
Refurbished submarines find new life in joint, stealth role.
The U.S. military’s elite units have another platform from which they can launch maneuvers. Devised from submarines the U.S. Navy had planned to decommission, the new vehicles will be multimission, multiservice platforms designed specifically for covert operations and special operations warfare.

The U.S. Navy plans to refurbish four nuclear ballistic missile (SSBN) Ohio-class Trident submarines into guided missile (SSGN) submarines. The interior of the submarines is being refitted to accommodate as many as 66 special operations forces from all military branches and their supplies and to provide support for operational missions. “A key capability of this ship is that it’s going to be very joint,” says Capt. David Norris, USN, SSGN program manager.

The first SSGN to be refurbished was the USS Ohio. It celebrated its return to service in February. It will remain stateside to undergo a series of increasingly advanced tests, which include weapons systems and lockout chambers testing, as well as to give the crew a chance to get familiar with the new systems. The ship is expected to deploy in 2007. General Dynamics Electric Boat, headquartered in Groton, Connecticut, is conducting the conversion work. Besides the reconfiguration, the Navy will refit each SSGN with a new nuclear reactor.

To accommodate the additional special operations forces, the team behind the refurbishing of the SSBNs to SSGNs knew they would have to fundamentally change the space within the submarine. They took one deck level of missile compartments and gutted it to make room for special operations troops. The area now contains 66 berths and extra head facilities. Other additions include a large shower room where divers or others returning from a mission can use warm water to raise their body temperatures and a drying space where they can dry wet suits.

The redesign also had to include space for the special operations forces’ mission-specific equipment. Some of the equipment can be stored in the center compartment where these troops sleep; however, equipment also will be stored as payload in special operations forces canisters. The canisters can be placed into torpedo tubes refitted to hold gear instead of weapons.

The other payload onboard is a group of Tomahawk missiles. Each tube can hold up to seven of these missiles. “The SSGN has an unprecedented payload capability, and that’s what’s making it a transformation warship for the U.S. Navy,” Capt. Norris explains.

The Trident SSBN has 24 launch tubes, but on the SSGN designers converted two tubes into lockout chambers for divers. According to John Biederka, Electric Boat SSGN program manager, creating the dive lockout chamber challenged the redesign team because it is safety critical. It had to be examined and tested repeatedly to ensure the safety of the divers and the crew.

When loaded for a full-strike mission, the SSGN has the capability to launch Tomahawk missiles from all 22 nonconverted tubes. With each tube able to hold seven missiles, the submarine could launch 154 Tomahawks. “One SSGN with that many missiles has about the same capability as 80 percent of a current naval battle group,” Capt. Norris says.

According to the captain, the concept of operation for the new Trident submarine requires that one tube remain open for experimentation. Capt. Norris says that possible uses for the experimental cylinder include holding a large container, an unmanned underwater vehicle or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that could be launched from the tube, or some type of sensor that comes out of the tube and provides a node in a network warfare system.

He adds that the subsurface vessel is the right ship at the right time for fighting a long war against a determined enemy. “It’s going to be a key contributor to the Navy’s participation in the global war on terror,” he notes.

The ability of the submarine’s crew to use the launch tubes for different capabilities—such as holding supplies—coupled with additional space for troops to stay on board allows special operations forces to remain on the SSGN longer than on other submarines. The vessel can sustain the special operations teams’ sleeping and eating needs. To accommodate the extended stay, the hull is big enough to house a firearms training simulator for the warfighters to practice shooting. “What makes the SSGN different from previous SEAL [sea, air and land forces] submarines is it carries an enormous number of SEALs and logistics such that you can mount a special warfare campaign,” Capt. Norris explains.

The SSGN has a high-bandwidth communications center on board as part of its battle management center. The center, which is 30 feet wide by 40 feet long, has the ability to host a joint task force communications effort. In the common submarine radio room, a space is available for a joint task force commander with associated staff to come onboard and plan the mission. For example, if an emergent requirement arose relating to the global war on terrorism, staff could come onboard and have the communications and control capability to manage and create a mission on the spot. The battle management center also allows personnel to monitor the diver lockout chambers and the dry dock shelters.

The dry dock shelters give the SSGN special operations forces several alternatives to using divers. The SSGN will not always carry divers on board. Instead, the submarine will have other methods for getting special operations forces to their objective. One method is the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), a minisubmarine that mounts on the back of the larger vessel. Using the ASDS, special warfare troops can reach the beach. Also mounted on the back of the SSGN is a drag back shelter, which is similar to a garage. It can house a SEAL delivery vehicle that can be used to transport warfighters to land.


The Ohio is a Trident submarine. The size of these ships makes them particularly adaptable to carrying extra personnel and equipment.
Equipping the SSGNs with multiple capabilities was one of the design team’s main goals during development, according to Biederka. “Flexibility is Trident in a nutshell,” he says.
In addition to its flexibility, the SSGN offers several other benefits during operations. For one, the submarine is inherently stealthy. The SSGN crew could launch its missiles or its special operations forces while still submerged, remaining covert. Another advantage is that a submarine stays out of the area of conflict. It also could launch a UAV while underwater and control the unmanned vehicle from the subsurface vessel. Capt. Norris likens using the UAV to giving the crew a 30,000-foot periscope.

The Navy and the U.S. Air Force tested a UAV launch and recovery during an exercise aboard the USS Alabama. The Alabama is an SSBN, but it was reconfigured to represent an SSGN platform. Enlisted airmen and Air Force officers from the 22nd and 23rd special tactics squadrons (STSs), McChord Air Force Base, Washington, participated in the exercise. Capt. Norris says special operations are inherently joint with each service bringing a specific knowledge. This environment prompts the services to train together using various platforms.

“If you truly understand special operations, we each bring a unique capability to the mission,” says Lt. Col. Michael Sneeder, USAF, commander, 22nd STS. “Do we have overlapping skills? Absolutely. But if you truly appreciate special ops, you realize we have unique expertise to bring to the fight.”

Col. Sneeder emphasizes that the Air Force brings air power expertise into the joint operation arena. STS troops are specialized in air rescue, but they also have the ability to conduct amphibious operations. For the airmen, it is just another way to commute. Col. Sneeder shares that in another theater they used donkeys to get to their objective. However, because the SSGNs are intended for use by special operations forces, they provide greater advantages to these warfighters. “Having a submarine designed specifically for special operations infiltration support … lends itself even more to being a great platform for special operations forces,” he emphasizes.

According to the Air Force Special Operations Command, Air Force STSs traditionally have trained and operated with Navy SEALs, U.S. Army special forces and Army Rangers. When teaming with special operations forces from other services, the Air Force squadrons have special experience in seizing enemy airfields and recovering distressed personnel in hostile territory. The STSs now aim to be ready to deploy on the SSGNs when necessary. A recent joint exercise was the first step in integrating submarine special tactics operations.

During the exercise, STS operators were flown to the submarine aboard a Navy search and rescue helicopter. The airmen loaded their gear and boarded the Alabama to prepare for the mission, which was to rescue a pilot who had crashed. The special operations forces had to treat the pilot’s injuries and get him back to the submarine. To begin the operation, the subsurface vessel dived and headed toward shore. After surfacing near land, the special tactics airmen inflated zodiac boats, loaded their gear and headed toward the target. “In this case, the submarine provided that stealthy infiltration platform to get us as close to the objective as possible,” Col. Sneeder explains.

In this scenario, the Air Force could not get airpower to the objective, which prevented recovery of the pilot through that method. The special tactics team had to find a way to reach the survivor over water instead of over land. Col. Sneeder says all joint special operations forces will use any sort of platform to reach their objective, and he points out how the other services’ special operations forces use airframes as well.

Two Navy SEALs acted as advisers during the exercise, providing their expertise on topics such as moving small boats into and out of submarines and recovering craft from submarines. The airmen were not the only ones working in a strange environment. Many of the crew from the Alabama had never worked with special operations forces in the past. “Having the two SEAL advisers onboard helped fuse the two teams together,” Col. Sneeder says.

Col. Sneeder shares that his airmen derived much value from the joint training exercise, and he hopes the Air Force and Navy special operations forces continue to have a relationship. He was amazed with the teamwork the Navy and Air Force developed, explaining that it seemed as if they had been working together for years. He adds that he was impressed at their ability to work as a team to overcome obstacles. However, learning to work from a new platform provided the most important training to the airmen. “Number one, it gave our guys an opportunity to train on a submarine-like environment,” Col. Sneeder says.

Although the Alabama was not originally designed to support special operations forces, the exercise demonstrated the potential of reconfiguring the submarines into SSGNs.

The four SSBNs are transforming into SSGNs at a staggered pace. After the Ohio, the next boat for conversion is the USS Florida, which will go to Jacksonville, Florida, for its return-to-service ceremony scheduled in late May. The USS Michigan is scheduled for delivery later this year, and the final submarine, the USS Georgia, is scheduled for delivery in 2007.



Web Resources
Command Submarine Group 9: https://www.csg9.navy.mil
U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command: www2.afsoc.af.mil
General Dynamics Electric Boat: www.gdeb.com

 

More on Sub Conversions

1 Consistent with this recommendation, the 5th through 8th Tridents were converted to carry thesame D5 missiles carried by the 9th through 18th Tridents. These Trident D5 conversions are not(continued...)Order Code RS21007Updated May 22, 2008Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN)Program: Background and Issues forCongressRonald O’RourkeSpecialist in Naval AffairsForeign Affairs, Defense, and Trade DivisionSummaryThe FY2006 budget completed the funding required in the Shipbuilding andConversion, Navy (SCN) account for the Navy’s program to refuel and convert fourTrident ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) into cruise-missile-carrying and specialoperations forces (SOF) support submarines (SSGNs). Initial Operational Capability(IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007. The total estimated cost ofthe program is about $4.0 billion. This report will be updated as events warrant.BackgroundTrident Submarines. The Navy procured 18 Ohio (SSBN-726) class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) between FY1974 and FY1991 to serve aspart of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force. They are commonly called Tridentsubmarines because they carry Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).The first Trident entered service in 1981, the 18th in 1997. The first 8 (SSBNs 726through 733) were originally armed with Trident I (C4) SLBMs; the final 10 (SSBNs 734through 743) were armed with larger and more powerful Trident II (D5) SLBMs. Theboats were originally designed for a 30-year life but were later certified for a 42-year life,composed of 20 years of operation, a two-year mid-life nuclear refueling overhaul, andthen another 20 years of operation.Origin of SSGN Conversion Concept. The Clinton Administration’s 1994Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) recommended a strategic nuclear force for the START IIstrategic nuclear arms reduction treaty that included 14 Tridents (all armed with D5missiles) rather than 18.1 This recommendation prompted interest in Congress andCRS-21 (...continued)to be confused with the separate Trident SSGN conversions discussed in this report. Therecommendation for a 14-boat force was made in expectation that the START II treaty wouldenter into force. The treaty has not entered into force. Section 1302 of the FY1998 defenseauthorization act prohibited U.S. strategic nuclear forces from being reduced during FY1998below START I levels (including 18 Trident SSBNs) until the START II treaty entered intoforce. This prohibition was extended through FY1999 by Section 1501 of the FY1999 defenseauthorization act and was made permanent by Section 1501 of the FY2000 defense authorizationact. The latter provision, however, also contained a section that would permit a reduction to 14Trident SSBNs, even without START II entering into force, if the President certifies to Congressthat this reduction would not undermine the effectiveness of U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Forfurther discussion, see CRS Report RL30033, Arms Control and Nonproliferation Activities: ACatalog of Recent Events, coordinated by Amy F. Woolf (out of print; available from the author).2 The G in SSGN stands for guided missile, a reference to the Tomahawk cruise missile or apotential future non-strategic land-attack missile.3 See, for example, William P. Houley, “Making the Case for SSGNs,” U.S. Naval InstituteProceedings, July 1999, pp. 47-49; Ernest Blazar, “A ‘New Dimension’ in WarfightingCapabilities,” Sea Power, July 1999, pp. 37-40; Andrew Krepinevich, “The Trident ‘StealthBattleship,’ An Opportunity for Innovation,” CSBA Backgrounder, February 24, 1999; Owen R.Jr. Cote, “How To Spend Defense Dollars,” Washington Times, January 15, 1999, p. 19.4 See Norman Polmar, “A Submarine for All Seasons?” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, August1999, pp. 87-88, and Norman Polmar, “The Submarine Arsenal Ship,” The Submarine Review,January 1997, pp. 7-9.elsewhere in the idea of converting the first 4 Trident SSBNs (SSBNs 726 through 729)into non-strategic submarines called SSGNs,2 so as to make good use of the 20 years ofpotential operational life remaining in these four boats and bolster the U.S. attacksubmarine (SSN) fleet, which has been significantly reduced in recent years. The BushAdministration’s 2002 NPR retained the idea of reducing the Trident SSBN force to 14boats.Some observers supported the SSGN conversion concept3 while a few othersquestioned it.4 The Navy in the late 1990s generally supported the concept in principlebut also expressed concern over its ability to finance all four conversions while alsofunding other priorities. Congress, as part of its action on the proposed FY1999 defensebudget, directed the Secretary of Defense to report on the issue to the congressionaldefense committees by March 1, 1999. The report was delivered to Congress in classifiedand unclassified form in June 1999. The Bush Administration highlighted the programas an example of defense transformation.The Bush administration, in its amended FY2002 defense budget submitted toCongress in June 2001, requested funding to begin the refueling and conversion of SSBNs727 and 729, and additional funding to begin the inactivation and dismantlement ofSSBNs 726 and 728. Since the Bush administration, prior to submitting this budget, hadhighlighted the Trident SSGN concept as an example of defense transformation, it cameas somewhat of a surprise, particularly to supporters of the SSGN concept, that the BushAdministration requested funding to convert only two of the four Tridents. Navy officialssaid the decision was driven in part by Navy budget constraints, and that the deadline forCRS-35 As a matter of policy for ensuring the safety and reliability of nuclear propulsion, nuclear-powered ships with exhausted nuclear fuel cores are not permitted to wait any significant timebetween the exhaustion of their nuclear fuel cores and the completion of preparations to refuelthem. If a ship cannot go immediately into a refueling operation, it is instead permanentlyinactivated. A decision to refuel a ship must therefore be made by a certain date prior to therefueling, so that the fuel cores and other equipment needed can be ordered and manufacturedin time to be ready for installation when the ship comes into dry dock.6 The Navy’s SOF personnel are called SEALs, which stands for Sea, Air, and Land.7 The ASDS is a new mini-submarine for Navy SEALs; the DDS is a less-capable predecessor.committing to the refueling and conversion of SSBNs 726 and 728 on a timely basis5 hadpassed some time between late 2000 and June 2001. This also came as a surprise to someobservers, since the Navy during the intervening months had not done much to publicizethe impending deadline. The Navy later explained, however, that refueling andconverting SSBNs 726 and 728 would still be possible if funds were provided in FY2002,though the schedule for planning and carrying out the operation would now be less thanoptimal. Congress, in marking up the FY2002 budget, increased funding for the programto the level the Navy said was needed to support a four-boat conversion program. TheBush Administration subsequently pursued the program as a four-boat effort.Description of the Conversion. The Tridents as converted can carry up to 154Tomahawk cruise missiles (or other non-strategic land attack missiles ) and 66 NavySEAL special operations forces (SOF) personnel.6 Each boat retains its 24 large-diameterSLBM launch tubes but the boats have been modified as follows:!SLBM tubes 1 and 2 were altered to serve as lockout chambers for theSOF personnel. Each chamber is equipped to connect to an AdvancedSEAL Delivery System (ASDS) or Dry Deck Shelter (DDS).7 Otherspaces were converted to berth and support 66 SOF personnel.!Tubes 3 through 24 were modified to carry 7 Tomahawks each, for a totalof 154 Tomahawks. Alternatively, tubes 3 through 10 can be used tocarry additional SOF equipment and supplies; leaving tubes 11 through24 to carry 98 missiles.!The Trident SLBM fire control systems were replaced with tacticalmissile fire control systems, and certain other systems aboard the boatswere modernized.In addition to these changes, each boat underwent a mid-life engineering (nuclear)refueling overhaul (ERO). Without EROs, the boats would have exhausted their nuclearfuel cores and been inactivated in the FY2003-FY2005 time frame.Missions and Concept of Operations. Each SSGN is to deploy for a periodof more than a year, during which time it is to be operated by dual (Blue and Gold) crewsrotating on and off the ship every three or four months. The aim is to have two of the fourSSGNs continuously forward deployed until the ships are decommissioned in the late2020s. As of September 30, 2007, SSBNs 726 and 727 were homeported in Puget Soundat Bangor, WA, while SSBNs 728 and 729 were homeported at Kings Bay, GA. Thereport of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, submitted to Congress in September2001, directed the Secretary of the Navy to explore options for homeporting SSGNs inCRS-48 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, September 30, 2001, p. 27.9 Sources: Oyaol Ngirairikl, “USS Ohio Moors at Bravo Wharf,” Navy News Service, January 17,2008, and Associated Press, “Submarine Ohio Underway in Pacific,” NavyTimes.com, October23, 2007.the Western Pacific.8 SSBNs 726 and 727, though homeported at Bangor, are operated outof the U.S. territory of Guam in the Western Pacific.9The SSGNs are to operate as covert platforms for conducting strike (i.e., land attack)and SOF-support missions. In the covert strike role, the boats can fulfill a substantialportion of the in-theater Tomahawk missile requirements that are established by regionalU.S. military commanders, and thereby permit forward-deployed multimission Navysurface combatants and SSNs to concentrate on other missions. In their SOF-support role,the SSGNs can be viewed as functional replacements for the James K. Polk (SSN-645)and the Kamehameha (SSBN-642) — two older-generation SSBNs that were convertedinto SSNs specifically for supporting larger numbers of SOF personnel. The Polk wasretired in 1999 at age 33; the Kamehameha was retired in 2002 at age 36. Trident SSGNs and Navy Transformation. The Bush Administration andother supporters of the Trident SSGN program highlighted the program as an example ofdefense transformation, citing the conversion of a strategic-nuclear-forces platform intoa non-strategic platform, the large number of cruise missiles that an SSGN will carry(which is several times the number that can be carried by a standard Navy attacksubmarine), and the large payload volume of the boats for carrying future advancedpayloads. Others observers demurred, arguing that Navy has converted older SSBNs intoSOF-support submarines in the past, that the larger number of cruise missiles that theSSGNs carry is more of a quantitative difference than a qualitative one, and that fundingthe Trident SSGN program may actually have slowed the transformation of the Navy’ssubmarine force by reducing the amount of funding available for research anddevelopment efforts supporting more radical and transformational changes to theVirginia-class attack submarine design. The submarine community intends to maximizethe transformational value of the SSGNs by using them as at-sea test beds for new ideas,such as using submarines to deploy large-diameter, highly capable unmanned underwatervehicles (UUVs). Even if one judges the program not transformational, one might stilljudge it cost effective in terms of the capabilities it provides and in realizing a full, 42-year return on the original procurement cost of the boats.Program Cost. As shown in Table 1, the Navy estimates the total cost forrefueling and converting four Tridents (including both research and development as wellas procurement costs) at about $4.0 billion, or about $1 billion per boat. This figurerepresents a substantial increase over earlier estimates for a four-boat program of about$2.4 billion in 1999-2000, and $3.3 billion to $3.5 billion in 2001-2002. Refueling andconverting four Tridents avoids a near-term expenditure of about $440 million toinactivate and dismantle them. The estimated net near-term additional cost to the budgetto convert the 4 boats rather than inactivate and dismantle them is thus $3.56 billion ($4.0billion less $440 million), or about $890 million per boat. DOD estimated in 1999 thatthe operating and support (O&S) cost for two SSGNs over 20 years would be $1,645.3million in constant FY1998 dollars, which equates to $1,777.9 million in constantFY2005 dollars, or an average of about $44.4 million per boat per year in constantCRS-510 Associated Press, “Submarine Ohio Underway in Pacific,” NavyTimes.com, October 23, 2007.The conversion of SSBN-726 began in November 2002 and was completed in December 2005;the ship reentered service in February 2006. The conversion of SSBN-728 began in August 2003and was completed in April 2006; the ship reentered service in May 2006. The conversion ofSSBN-727 began in March 2004 and was completed in November 2006; the ship reenteredservice in June 2007. The conversion of SSBN-729 began in March 2005 and was completed inDecember 2007; the ship is scheduled to reenter service on March 28, 2008.11 Under the previous START strategic nuclear arms reduction treaties, the SSGNs would remainaccountable as strategic nuclear launch systems because they would retain their large-diameterSLBM launch tubes. Four SSGNs, even though they carried no SLBMs, would be counted as(continued...)FY2005 dollars. Using this figure, the total 20-year life-cycle cost for four TridentSSGNs (including research and development costs, annual operation and support costs,and eventual inactivation and dismantlement costs) would be roughly $7.6 billion inconstant FY2005 dollars.Table 1. FY2000-FY2013 Funding for SSGN Conversion Program(millions of then-year dollars, rounded to nearest million)0001020304050607080910111213TotalR&D1336728265192325000000336SCN00354999117551528300000003326OPN000110012061013431000384Total13364261191124165431235134310004046Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, March 18, 2008. Totals may not add due to rounding. R&Dis funding in the Navy’s Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) appropriation account inprogram element (PE) 0603563N (FY2000) and PE 0603559N (FY2001-FY2007). SCN is procurementfunding in the Navy’s Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) account in Line Item (LI) 2017. OPN isprocurement funding in the Navy’s Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) account in LIs 0950 and 1010.Program Schedule. All four Trident conversions have been completed, andInitial Operational Capability (IOC) for the program was declared on November 1, 2007.SSBN-726, the first ship to be converted, reportedly began its first operationaldeployment as an SSGN in October 2007.10Shipyards and Prime Contractor. The refuelings and conversions wereperformed by the Puget Sound Naval Shipyard (PSNSY) at Bremerton, WA SSBNs 726and 727) and the Norfolk Naval Shipyard (NNSY) at Norfolk, VA (SSBNs 728 and 729).General Dynamics’ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point,RI, the designer and builder of all 18 Tridents, is the prime contractor for the program.GD/EB is the conversion execution integrator for all four boats and is managing thecompletion of conversion construction activities.Arms Control and “Phantom Warhead” Issue. On May 13, 2002, theAdministration announced that it had reached an agreement with Russia on a newstrategic nuclear arms treaty that would require each side to reduce down to 1,700 to2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by 2012. The agreement appears to resolve, from theU.S. perspective at least, a potential issue regarding the counting of “phantom” strategicnuclear warheads on converted Trident SSGNs.11CRS-611 (...continued)carrying 96 Trident SLBMs each with 4 nuclear warheads, for a total of 384 warheads. Havingto include 384 “phantom” warheads within the allowed START II U.S. strategic nuclear forceof 3,500 warheads was viewed as problematic from a U.S. perspective, since it would deprive theUnited States of about 11% of its permitted warheads. The alternative of asking Russia toexempt SSGNs from the counting scheme was also viewed as problematic, since Russia wouldlikely either refuse or ask for something significant in return. The phantom warhead issue wouldhave been even more pronounced under a potential START III treaty that might have limited theUnited States to 2,500 or fewer nuclear warheads. The phantom warhead issue appeared to havereceded for a time due to the Administration’s originally stated intention to not completeratification of START II, and to instead reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces unilaterally, withoutthe use of new treaties. This would leave only the older START I treaty, with its much higherpermitted nuclear force levels, as an in-force treaty against which the SSGNs could be counted.On February 5, 2002, however, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced that the United Stateswas seeking a legally binding agreement with Russia on future levels of strategic nuclearweapons. This created a potential for the phantom warhead issue to once again becomepotentially relevant. The new U.S.-Russian arms treaty announced on May 13, 2002, resolvedthe issue from the U.S. perspective by counting only operationally deployed strategic nuclearwarheads and not strategic nuclear launch systems. Since the SSGNs will not deploy strategicnuclear warheads, the Administration is excluding them from the treaty’s limit of 1,700 to 2,200operationally deployed warheads. Russia to date has not publicly objected to this interpretation.12 For more on the 313-ship fleet and the 30-year shipbuilding plan, see CRS Report RL32665,Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronal

 

Yep, been away too long. The conversions for Tomahawk are well known (and are incorporated in the newer class boats) as is the cargo carrying in launch tubes. I was not aware of the ability to lock out divers from a tube, but it has always been possible from the trunks, and was so used by the diesels back in the day (or so were were told by some old salts.)

 

Lock outs are now commonly carried out via a hull mounted Pressure vessel where a crew and all their equipment are expelled in mass below the surface. Such as Zodiacs or Self contained submersibles with auto or manual inflatable for the Zodiacs.

 

Because that's what we do-ALAFRICKINBAMA! ROLL TIDE!!

 

At least Bama is SEC. Go Vols!
Of course if they inject political BS into college football I won’t be watching that either!

 

Me too, MM! I gave up on all professional sports due to all their political and other BS and now only watch college but they are starting to get too political for me also.